When one partner in a couple becomes unemployed, one might suppose that the other partner will find a job to supplement the household income. However, previous research indicates the opposite of this 'added worker' effect in Britain, adding to rising concern about the growth of 'workless' households there. In this paper we test this finding and investigate how it relates to welfare benefits received by the unemployed, comparing two countries with different welfare systems, Britain and Germany. We compare the labour-force transitions of the wives of unemployed and employed men using discrete-time event-history modelling on the BHPS and GSOEP, in the first piece of work on this question which is both comparative and longitudinal.
Introduction
When one partner in a couple becomes unemployed, one might suppose that the other partner will find a job in order to supplement the household income. This is the so-called 'added worker' effect predicted by the classical economic approach to labour supply.
Theoretical models of family labour supply suggest that the unemployment of one spouse should increase the likelihood of employment of the other spouse (see e.g. Ashenfelter, 1980) . 1 However, Table 1 indicates the opposite of the 'added worker' effect in Britain. In
Britain the employment rate of the wives of unemployed men is considerably lower than the employment rate of the wives of employed men. The data presented are for 1991, but replicate a well-established trend in Britain (see Dex et al., 1995 for a discussion). In West Germany, by contrast, Table 1 indicates little difference in the employment rates of the wives of employed and unemployed men. It is the task of this paper to investigate this difference between Britain and West Germany using longitudinal data. The data in Table 1 suggest that in Britain 'worklessness' will cluster around certain sorts of households, an issue which has been the subject of considerable policy interest in recent years in Britain. In their chapter entitled 'The rise of the workless household ', Gregg et al. (1999) draw our attention to increasing polarization of employment. They show how, though aggregate employment remained unchanged, in 1990 there were twice as many households out of work as in 1975. There has been a simultaneous rise in both 'work-rich'
and 'work-poor' households (Gregg et al., 1999) . The authors note how, as the distribution of work widens, so too does the distribution of income. In the analysis in this paper we investigate how a certain type of workless household comes into being, one in which the man is unemployed and the woman is out of the labour market. By comparing Britain and Germany and their different approaches to welfare policy for the unemployed, we attempt to shed some light on the role of policy in creating workless households.
Previous Findings
A number of studies have examined this issue in Britain and suggested a number of possible explanations for the absence of an added-worker effect. One is that women married to unemployed men may be seeking paid work in labour markets which provide fewer opportunities than local labour markets of married women in general. There may be common characteristics (either observable or unobservable) which make it less likely that either partner will be employed. These could be either level of education or what Doris (1999b) describes as the 'taste' for market work. Another explanation proposed by economists is that the leisure times of husbands and wives may be complements rather than substitutes, so the couple may prefer to spend time together, rather than the wife working when the man is unemployed (Doris, 1999b ). Yet Whelan and McGinnity (2000) point to a profound disutility caused by unemployment, which is exacerbated by income poverty, suggesting that leisure, on these terms, may not be complementary. Another relevant issue is that women may be very reluctant to take over the role of the 'breadwinner'. According to McKee and Bell (1985) , in interviews with couples in which the husband was unemployed, both husbands and wives mentioned how negatively they viewed the prospect of the woman becoming the breadwinner; many became emotional at the prospect.
But the explanation at the core of much of the literature on this issue has been unemployment compensation. Though unemployment insurance, which insures individuals against the loss of income when unemployed, may also reduce the added-worker effect, most of the debate has been about means-tested benefits. Unemployment benefits which are means-tested against family income may generate disincentives to work for the spouse of the unemployed person. The possibility that administrative rules governing the entitlement to benefit income may discourage women from entering the labour market to offset the loss of household income, or worse, may encourage working women to leave the labour market, is a cause for concern-particularly given the link previously noted between unemployment in work-poor households and poverty. If this is the case, comparing Britain and Germany, two countries with very different approaches to means-testing the unemployed, could prove very fruitful.
Evidence from previous research on Britain has produced somewhat inconclusive findings. Cooke (1987) , in his review, finds some evidence for many of the explanations proposed above. Davies, Elias, and Penn (1992) , in their analyses of individual labour markets, find some 'cross-couple state dependence' in employment status-enough to warrant investigation-but stress the finding that unemployed men are more likely to have wives with low levels of labour-force attachment, and that this accounts for more of any participation difference than cross-couple state dependence. Ercolani and Jenkins (2000) , using a conditional logit model applied to monthly BHPS data, find a negative effect of the means-tested income support on the partner's participation and find mixed effects of unemployment benefit.
Of studies which attempt to measure the budget constraint more explicitly, Kell and Wright (1990) report significant and large negative effects of means-testing on the participation of wives. Doris (1999a) finds that households headed by an unemployed man entitled to either unemployment benefit or income support are strongly affected by meanstesting.
In Germany policy interest in the subject has been much more limited. In a study on Germany using GSOEP data, Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) find no clear impact of a married man being unemployed on his wife's labour-force status. They do find a negative effect of unemployment assistance on wife's employment in one of their models, but the finding was not robust. However, they point out that their results apply to one country alone, and that variation in institutional details of benefit regimes may affect the findings. This is an issue we will pursue in this paper.
The one major cross-national analysis on this topic was carried out by Dex et al (1995) . Dex et al compare the relationship between women's participation and their husband's labour-force status in a range of benefit regimes (Britain, Ireland, USA, Sweden, and Denmark). In countries where unemployment benefit is a wholly individual benefit, the wives of unemployed men do not appear to experience effects on labour-market participation. Where unemployment benefits take a wife's earnings into account, there is always a significant negative effect on those wives' labour-force participation. However, Dex et al. (1995) note the limitations of cross-sectional research and recommend a longitudinal perspective.
Finally, from a different perspective, a recent paper by DiPrete and McManus (2000) compares the income mobility effects of certain 'trigger' events such as employment changes in the household and changes in household composition in Germany and the USA.
Salient for this paper is the finding that, following their male partner's exit from the labour market, German women tend to increase their labour supply, suggesting an added-worker effect.
Since the various explanations of this phenomenon deal, in part, with the social policy regime, one route to exploring the issue is to conduct cross-national comparisons. As Dex et al (1995: 613) argue, 'cross-national comparisons are an ideal method for exploring the effects of country-specific differences such as the differences in policy regimes and the incentives they set up.' In this paper we compare the labour-force participation of wives in two countries with different policy regimes. In particular, Britain and Germany differ considerably in the extent of means-testing of the unemployed. They also differ, as we saw in Table 1 , in the gap in the employment rate of the wives of unemployed men.
We attempt to address this issue by looking at a group of married or cohabiting women's labour-force transitions. 2 We first briefly review features of the benefit systems in
Britain and Germany which might be expected to affect labour-force transitions, and formulate some hypotheses. In the following section we discuss the data used and review preliminary evidence on the association between husbands' and wives' labour-force states.
We then discuss approaches to modelling this process, and explain and introduce the choice of model. We use event-history modelling to examine women's transitions in and out of paid employment. After a discussion of the results, we draw some conclusions about similarities and differences between Britain and Germany. While there have been cross-national (i.e. Dex et al., 1995) and longitudinal (Giannelli and Micklewright, 1995) analyses of this issue, this is the first piece of work which is both comparative and longitudinal.
Unemployment Benefit Regimes and Incentives for Wives to Work
As a prelude to comparing the labour-market transitions of women, we now briefly review similarities and differences in the 'unemployment benefit regimes' in Britain and Germany, and how they might affect incentives for wives to work.
The unemployment compensation systems in Britain and Germany are summarized in Table 2 . The particular aspect of unemployment compensation which concerns this paper is whether a husband's unemployment-related benefits are linked to his wife's earnings in any way. A link can arise if the man's benefit is means-tested on the basis of family income, or if any part of the benefit is withdrawn when the woman is working or earning. We would expect that withdrawal of benefits would create a disincentive for the wife to work, the scale of which would be likely to depend on the rate of withdrawal of the benefit and its amount.
Our particular focus will therefore be the extent and nature of means-testing, whether there is extra money paid for a dependent spouse, and whether there are earnings disregards.
There are means-tested and non-means-tested benefits paid to the unemployed in both Britain and Germany, but a significant difference in the proportion of the unemployed receiving each. As we can see from the last column in Table 2 , the majority of German unemployed receive insurance benefit, while in Britain the majority receive means-tested benefit.
Insurance-based benefit is normally paid on the basis of an individual's past contributions and is not means-tested on family income. In Germany the unemployed receive a slightly higher rate if they have children, but there is no extra allowance paid for partners.
In this case we would expect no significant effect on the wife's participation rate. With
British insurance benefit a dependant's allowance is added on to the main unemployment benefit where a man has a non-employed wife. In 1996 this extra allowance was 76 per cent of the amount payable to the claimant (Child Poverty Action Group, 1997) . This allowance is withdrawn if the wife earns more than this amount. In the case of British unemployment insurance benefit then we would expect that wives of unemployed men would experience a small disincentive effect to participate in the labour market.
In both countries there are means-tested benefits for those who are either not eligible for insurance benefit, or are no longer eligible for insurance benefit because their unemployment has persisted. These schemes are means-tested on family income and thus create a disincentive for the wife to work. There are important earnings disregards in the application of means-testing. In the British scheme-Income Support (see Table 2 )-the earnings disregard for the spouse is low: £5 per week in most cases. We expect this to act as a strong disincentive for wives to work. In Germany, of the two means-tested benefits, for a As a proportion of all the registered unemployed. b The earnings disregard for Arbeitslosenhilfe is DM70 higher for children. The earnings disregard calculation changed for Arbeitslosenhilfe in January 1994. The focus here is on the pre-1994 regulations, as the analysis for Germany in this paper is based on the period up until December 1993. c Most German unemployed receive this benefit after having received Arbeitslosengeld for one year: a small proportion of the unemployed receive this benefit if they have some (six months') contributions from having worked, but not enough to qualify for Arbeitslosengeld. d The earnings disregard for Sozialhilfe is variable, depending on the earnings of the spouse. Sources: For benefit information-Britain, Department of Social Security, Social Security Statistics; Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1997 and own estimates from the GSOEP, 1996 for Sozialhilfe, as these are not available from official statistics. Note that the GSOEP may underestimate receipt of Sozialhilfe.
The paper assesses the evidence for these disincentives by modelling women's exit from and entry into employment in Britain and Germany, controlling for the woman's characteristics and labour-market characteristics. We now describe the data used, and then present some initial evidence on the labour-force status of husbands and wives.
German and British Panel Data and Labour Force States of Spouses
In this paper the analysis for Germany is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); the analysis for Britain is based on data from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) (Taylor et al., 1999; Halpin, 1997; Wagner et al., 1993) . At each wave in both surveys respondents were asked to indicate their labour-force status for the preceding 12 months. 4 We select a sample of continuously married ( As male unemployment may have an impact on marriage itself (e.g. Lampard, 1994) , there may be an indirect influence on female labour participation as a result of this. By excluding persons not continuously married we are conditioning on the stability of marriage.
For this reason we need to ensure that the length of the period in both countries is identical (70 months). We use information about the annual regional unemployment rate to account for temporal and regional variation in the demand for labour. For this analysis we select only West German households; foreigners and later extensions of the survey are excluded. For
Britain we select only non-ethnic households. 5 The women are all aged between 18 and 55 (inclusive) in the month the observation window starts. This generates a sample of 1279 couples for Britain and 1199 couples for West Germany.
Measuring Labour-Force Status
For the first part of the analysis labour-force statuses recorded in the monthly calendar are aggregated from detailed categories into the following labour-force states:
1. Employment
Non-participation
For most categories, labour-force status is self-defined. Employment includes full-time, parttime, and temporary employment. The 'non-participation' category comprises the retired, those in full-time education and training, those undertaking home duties, and 'others'. 6 Our focus is on women's moves between employment and non-participation. Moves to unemployment are censored.
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In this paper we treat the husband's labour-force status as exogenous to his wife's and as a time-varying covariate in the model. For each individual we match the monthly calendar of the husband to that of his wife. As we are particularly interested in spells of unemployment for the husband, the husband's labour-force status is categorized as one of:
In Table 3 we compare wives' participation for different labour-force states of their husbands in Britain and Germany, using the data described above. (1991 ) and West Germany (1988 -1993 This table using monthly data is broadly consistent with the cross-sectional statistics presented in Table 1 . We see that though for Germany there is a relatively small difference between the participation rate of the wives of employed and unemployed men (column 3), in
Britain there is a large difference. 8 And while in West Germany the participation rate of the wives of unemployed men is actually somewhat higher than for wives of employed men, in
Britain the opposite is the case. These results are almost identical to the cross-tabulations presented by Ercolani and Jenkins using the same data (BHPS) for Britain. They are somewhat different to those of Giannelli and Micklewright's (1995) estimates for Germany.
In particular we report a higher proportion of women in employment for all states of the husband. This may be because we look at a later time period. 9 Given that these differences may be due to a number of factors, we need to examine these differences, controlling for the wife's personal and labour-market characteristics. The model we use is the subject of the next section.
Modelling Women's Labour-Force Transitions
We are primarily concerned with the decision of the woman to be employed or not given that her husband is unemployed. In practice, this may not be an individual decision, but a joint decision with the husband. In this paper the simpler assumption is made that it is an individual decision, i.e. that the husband's labour-force status is exogenous.
Most of the econometric work to date which has looked at this problem has done so from a cross-sectional perspective. Davies et al (1992) estimate a cross-sectional logistic regression model of a wife's participation in six labour markets in 1986, including a correction for heterogeneity. Dex et al (1995) , in their cross-national comparison, use a logit or probit to model the dichotomous participation decision, including an instrumented wage for the woman's potential wage and a linearized budget constraint to account for differences in the tax systems. Garcia (1991) constructs a discrete-choice model which uses the detailed potential net income of the household for alternative labour supply decisions of the wife.
Using a different approach, Ercolani and Jenkins (2000) and Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) use panel data, but estimate a static model-the conditional logistic regression model. No account of the woman's potential wage or the budget constraint is included in these papers.
While it can correct for unobservables, this static approach by definition assumes independence of participation status over time. Using an event-history modelling approach we can relax this assumption. We can ask the question-'what is the probability that a woman leaves the labour-force when her husband becomes unemployed?'-rather than-'what is the probability that a woman is out of the labour-force, given that her husband is unemployed?'. Equally, focusing on the opposite transition, we can ask-'what is the probability that a woman will move to employment when her husband becomes unemployed?'. It is plausible that these are different processes, and that a woman's previous employment status will have a strong influence on her behaviour when her husband becomes unemployed. This is similar to the approach adopted by Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) in the second part of their paper. A limitation of this modelling strategy is that there is no potential wage for the woman. It was not practicable to calculate a potential net wage for the wife for the monthly data used in this paper, as the kind of information required is not available in these data-sets.
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The form of event-history modelling used in this paper to analyse women's labourforce transitions is discrete-time event-history modelling (Allison, 1982 (Allison, , 1984 . Discretetime models are particularly suited to our analysis because of the relatively short observation period and the fact that our response variable is already in a discrete monthly format. The model also allows easy and direct handling of time-varying covariates. The general approach is to model the conditional probability of a transition, given that the transition has not occurred. We focus on transitions from employment to non-participation and from nonparticipation to employment. How does this hazard rate (or conditional probability) depend on the covariates? The most popular choice for discrete-time modelling (Cox, 1972; Alison, 1982 ) is the logit link. Assuming duration dependence in the hazard, the logit link specifies the relationship between the hazard rate and the covariates thus:
where t α is a set of constants (t=1…T)-the baseline hazard-when x = 0, and t β allows the effect of the covariates ( it x ) to vary with time. If we assume no duration dependence in the hazard, the logit link is simply:
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. Our reasons for presenting findings on the latter are discussed in the following discussion on censoring.
One common problem of duration data of this kind is censoring. Censoring exists when incomplete information is available about the spell because of a limited observation period (in our case 70 months). The two main forms of censoring of concern to us are rightcensoring and left-censoring.
11 Right-censoring occurs when the period of observation ends before a person has made the transition, and is well handled by the model we use (Allison, 1984) . Left-censoring is when a spell begins before the observation period, and we do not know when it begins. Provided we assume that there is no duration dependence in the hazard it may easily be shown that left-censoring is of little practical importance (Giannelli and Micklewright, 1995) . If we wish to allow for duration dependence in the hazard rate, we have no alternative but to exclude left-censored spells. However, this would exclude many transitions out of longer spells of employment and inactivity: while 70 months is quite a long period for looking at unemployment, it is a relatively short period if we are looking at employment or inactivity. We would then be selecting only those with 'shorter' spells of employment or inactivity, and this may also bias the findings.
While most of the analysis assumes no duration dependence in the hazard, and includes left-censored spells, we rerun all the models to check if our results are sensitive to this assumption. These results are reported in the text. In addition, we include a number of variables which measure some aspects of the work history prior to the spell. Including a measure of the woman's previous labour-market history, and the husband's duration of unemployment, allows us to 'control', to some extent, the history prior to the spell. As a second sensitivity test, we split the spells of participation into full-time and part-time work, as full-time work may differ in a number of ways from part-time work.
After the models are estimated, a significance of difference test is applied comparing each coefficient for Germany and for Britain. This test uses information about the differences in the coefficients and their standard error, to provide an indication of the significance of difference between them. The t-statistic is calculated using the following formula:
where G βˆ is the coefficient for Germany, and B βˆ the coefficient for Britain, and σˆ the relevant standard error.
One key covariate of interest in this model is the husband's monthly labour-force status, which we described in detail in the previous section. Another important covariate is the unemployment benefits received by the husband. For receipt of unemployment benefits, both surveys record receipt and type of benefits in monthly calendars in a similar way to labour-force status. This information is matched to information about unemployment spells, and dummy variables constructed, indicating husband's receipt of unemployment-related benefits. For Germany, social assistance is not reported in the monthly calendars for this period.
Other control variables in the models are also time-varying. As labour-force participation is expected to vary by age and generation we include the age of both partners.
Given the limited state provision of childcare in Britain and Germany, we expect the presence and age of children to affect the woman's labour-market participation.
Educational qualifications are also expected to affect women's labour-force participation, as highly educated women are more likely to be employed. Educational qualifications are coded according to a variant of the 'casmin' schema (see Koenig, Luettinger, and Mueller 1988) . 12 We represent the effects of fluctuations in the macroeconomic cycle discussed in the preceding section by using annual data on regional unemployment from national sources. This is an example of what Blossfeld describes as a 'parallel process at the macro level' (Blossfeld, 1998: 237) .
Finally, we include a longer-term measure of labour-force experience. 'Proportion of time previously employed' is measured as the proportion of time employed since entering the labour market before the woman's spell began, using data from the long-term work histories on the surveys. Information about a woman's previous employment history could be proxy information for a number of factors. We expect it to have a strong effect on women's transitions.
Flows in and out of Employment: Findings for Britain and Germany
In this section we present the results of our models using the discrete-time event-history modelling described above. As previously noted, our primary focus is on husband's labourforce status, particularly unemployment, and the benefits he receives. Our focus is on two types of transition-from labour-force inactivity to employment (presented in Table 4 ) and from employment to labour-force inactivity (presented in Table   5 ). For each of these transitions we present three models for each country. In Model 1 we simply distinguish husband's labour-force status, with husband employed as the reference category, focusing on the effect of husband's unemployment on the woman's probability of changing state. However, for a number of reasons there may be a delay in a wife's change in labour-force status when a husband becomes unemployed. First, a woman may initially believe that her husband's unemployment will not last long enough to justify the transaction costs associated with finding a job, only to give it up again when he returns to work.
Equally, she may not give up her job immediately if she believes her husband's unemployment will not last. Secondly, it may take the woman time to find a job, particularly if it is also necessary to find alternative childcare arrangements. So in Model 2 we distinguish spells of husband's unemployment into very short-term (1 to 6 months), mediumterm (7 to 12 months), and long-term (greater than or equal to 13 months). Finally, in Model 3, given our interest in the effect of benefit receipt on the wife's employment, we distinguish husband's unemployment by benefit status. This is because, as described above, we expect that insurance benefits and means-tested benefits may have different effects on labourmarket participation. For each of these models we include the other covariates described above, details of which are given under each table and in the Appendix.
In the first set of models the transition of interest is from labour-force inactivity to employment (see Table 4 ). The most important finding for us from Model 1 is that while for Britain the wives of unemployed men are less likely to move to employment than the wives of employed men, for Germany the opposite is the case. This difference is significant using the significance of difference test (column 7). In fact in Germany the findings are consistent with what we described earlier as an 'added worker' effect, i.e. wives of unemployed men taking up a job to compensate for the lost earnings of their husband. They are also consistent with the findings of DiPrete and McManus (2000) described above, who found that German women increase their labour supply to offset declines in labour earnings by the male breadwinner. This effect in Britain is consistent with previous findings and with Tables 1   and 3 . In both cases the findings are significant at the 0.05 level.
When we distinguish the husband's unemployment spell by different durations of unemployment in Model 2, we find the strongest effect, as expected, for long-term unemployment of the husband. In Britain the negative effect of husband's unemployment increases in a stepwise fashion with increasing duration of unemployment. In Germany, there is actually a slight negative effect on the transition for husband's unemployment spells of 7 to 12 months, but a strong positive effect for husband's unemployment spells of 13 months and over. The difference between the coefficients for long-term unemployed husbands is significant (see column 7). So, German women only become 'added workers' when their husband has been unemployed for one year or more. There are a number of possible factors which may influence this, either singly or in combination. These women may be initially unsure of the duration of their husband's unemployment, or it may take them some time to find a job. Another factor is that after 12 months unemployment the amount of benefit falls by around 12-15 per cent for most unemployed German men, as they move from Arbeitslosengeld to Arbeitslosenhilfe. This may encourage the wife to work to compensate for the fall in income. A 'model chi-square' statistic is calculated for each of the models, by taking the difference between the initial -2 log-likelihood of the model (i.e. without any covariates), and the final -2 log-likelihood for the full model. The model chi-square for the models are the following: 128.3, 128.5; 290.23, 291.05. Women are aged 18-55 (inc.) at the beginning of the observation period. Source: Own estimates from the GSOEP and BHPS monthly calendar data.
In Model 3 we look at the effect of husband's benefit receipt on his wife's transition from labour-force inactivity to employment. In Britain we find quite a difference between the effects of means-tested and insurance benefits. For women whose unemployed husbands receive insurance benefit, their probability of transition is rather similar to the wives of employed men. The wives of unemployed men receiving assistance benefit in Britain are much less likely to move to employment, and this difference is significant. We noted in Table 2 that the majority of the unemployed in Britain receive this assistance benefit. This effect is consistent with the much-discussed disincentive effect of means-tested benefit in Britain. For Germany the wives of unemployed men receiving assistance benefit, and those receiving no benefit are much more likely to enter employment than wives of employed men, and this difference is significant compared to Britain for both these groups (see column 7). It is for these wives that the added-worker effect operates. The probability of the wives of unemployed men who receive insurance benefit (the majority group) entering employment is not significantly different from that of the wives of employed men, the reference category.
We should add that for both Britain and Germany there is a strong correlation between those receiving assistance benefit and the long-term unemployed. So for Germany the most plausible explanation of our findings seems to be that the added-worker effect is strongest for the wives of long-term unemployed men, and this outweighs any assistance benefit disincentive effect. For Britain, it seems that any added-worker effect is being outweighed by other effects, one of which could certainly be a disincentive effect of assistance benefit. At this point we should reiterate our earlier comment that the assistance benefits in Britain and Germany reported in this table are of a rather different nature. In Germany unemployment assistance is earnings linked, has no dependant's allowance, and has a significantly higher earnings disregard than in Britain (see Table 2 ). In Britain the assistance benefit is flat-rate, with a generous dependant's allowance and a very low earnings disregard.
Turning to wives whose husbands are out of the labour force, there is also a difference in findings between Britain and Germany. However, some of this difference may depend on the reasons why the husband is out of the labour force, and investigating this is beyond the scope of this paper. From Appendix Table A1 we can see that the effects of the other covariates in the models are largely as expected. Wives with young children (under 3) in Britain are less likely to move to employment, though in Germany the effect of having children of any age is small and statistically not significant. In both countries more educated women are more likely to move to employment. Finally, a strong predictor of whether a woman will move to employment in either country is her previous employment history, measured as the proportion of time since leaving school spent in employment.
In Table 5 we turn to examine the transition from employment to inactivity. As in Table 4 , we present the results of three models for each country with the significance of difference test. The results of the full model, including all covariates, are in Appendix Table   A2 . For each of the Models 4, 5, and 6, it should be noted that none of the coefficients for husband's unemployment for either country are significant. So while for Model 4 the estimates indicate that the wives of unemployed men are less likely to move to inactivity from employment in both countries, these effects are not significant. Investigating the issue further in Model 5, the coefficients suggest that in Germany it is the wives of short-term unemployed men who are least likely to leave employment-though again the findings are not statistically significant. Turning to the effect of the benefit that the husband receives, we find some cross-country differences, though these effects are not robust to the significance of difference test, as the standard errors of the coefficients are large. In summary, the results of the analysis of this transition suggest that the wives of unemployed men do not have a greater tendency to leave employment in either country. Notes: Other covariates included in all the models are: wife's age at start of spell; husband's age at start of spell; wife's education level (casmin); husband's education level (casmin); number of children aged 0-3, 3-5, 5-16; employment rate in the region of residence; and proportion of wife's time in employment since leaving education. For full results of Model 1 for each country see Appendix.
Model chi-square for the models, as described in the notes to Table 4 , are the following : 175.8, 172.5; 279.5, at the beginning of the observation period.
Source: Own estimates from the GSOEP and BHPS monthly calendar data.
The results of other covariates are presented in the Appendix. In general, those with a higher level of education are less likely to leave employment, although the effect is weakened by the addition of the measure of employment history to the model. For both countries women with children are more likely to leave the labour market than those without.
As expected, the younger the child, the larger the effect. Finally, for both Britain and Germany the largest effect on withdrawal from the labour market is previous labour-market history-women who have more employment experience are more likely to stay in employment.
We perform two tests to check the sensitivity of our findings. 13 We first test our findings using a sample which excludes all left-censored spells, i.e. includes only those spells which began after the start date. These models include a simple form of duration dependence in the hazard. We find that for Germany the findings for the transition from inactivity to employment are similar, except that in this model wives of the short-term unemployed are also more likely to move to employment than the wives of employed men.
For Britain the findings for the transition from inactivity to employment are somewhat different. With this sample the negative effect of husband's unemployment on this transition only remains for wives of husbands who are long-term unemployed, or who are receiving income support. For the transition from employment to inactivity the findings for husband's employment status are similar. As discussed above, we prefer to present the findings of models which include left-censored spells, as otherwise we exclude many longer spells.
As a further test of the sensitivity of our findings we distinguish transitions to employment between full-time and part-time work, using the same calendar data from the surveys. We now have six transitions between the three states which are modelled as three multinomial models, in an extension of our earlier event-history modelling technique, using the same covariates. The main effects of note are for the transitions from inactivity to either part-time or full-time employment. Here we discover that German wives of unemployed men are more likely to move into full-time employment than the wives of employed men, and this effect is significant when the husband is long-term unemployed. For Britain, we previously found that British women married to unemployed men are less likely to move to employment. Here we find that the effect is large and statistically significant only for the wife's transition to part-time work. For other transitions we look at, the results concerning husband's unemployment tend to be not statistically significant, partly because of the low number of cases making certain transitions.
Conclusions
What have we learned from our analysis of the labour-force transitions of wives? The significant findings relate to women's transitions into employment. In Germany, when a man becomes unemployed, his wife is more likely to enter employment, than when he was employed. In Britain, when a man becomes unemployed, his wife is less likely to enter employment than if he were employed-in particular she is less likely to enter part-time employment. Both of these mechanisms come into effect when the husband has been unemployed for 13 months or more and is normally receiving means-tested benefit (or no benefit in Germany). In Germany this is a smaller group-most German unemployed receive insurance benefit, as we saw in Table 2 , and the findings from our modelling suggest that the labour-market behaviour of their wives is no different from that of the wives of employed men. So in beginning to understand the differences in participation rates we noted at the beginning of this paper, we discovered that when men become unemployed in Germany women move into employment; in Britain they do not.
Why is this the case? This question is more difficult to answer. In Germany there certainly seems to be evidence of an added-worker effect in operation: any disincentive effect of benefits we might have expected is outweighed by this. When we turn to Britain, the question is more complex. As regards some of the explanations proposed at the beginning of this paper, we have ruled out an added-worker effect. The argument about local labour markets was more difficult to test, though we do control for regional unemployment rates. The explanation about the labour-force attachment of women we could include in our model and found it does have resonance. The wives of unemployed men have, on average, spent less of their post-education life in the labour market, and this affects their propensity to enter employment. However, we find an effect of husband's current labour-force status, i.e. unemployment, even after controlling for this. While there may be some effect of the wife being a reluctant breadwinner, we have no reason to suspect that this effect would be much larger in Britain than in Germany. Instead, we are left with the strong suspicion that there is a disincentive effect of means-tested benefit in the UK, which partly explains why the wives of unemployed men are less likely to enter employment than others.
Conversely, we find no significant effects for the transition of the wives of unemployed men out of employment. Clearly when a woman already has a job, the influence of unemployment and benefits received is different than when she is not employed. Other covariates in this model, like her previous labour-market history and the presence of young children, have a much greater influence on women's transitions out of the labour force than their husband's current unemployment.
From a methodological point of view, we have discovered some positive effects of using a dynamic perspective to address this issue. We can relax the assumption that the wife's current status is independent of her status immediately previous to her current status, which is very much in keeping with the idea that the past conditions the present. Using cross-sectional data, as in Table 1 , we observe what proportion of the wives of unemployed men are employed at any given time. Using longitudinal data we can distinguish between those women who were working when their husband became unemployed, and those who were out of the labour force when the husband became unemployed. We can look at two separate processes by which cross-couple dependence in labour-force status comes about. On the one hand is the move from employment to labour-force inactivity and on the other the move from inactivity to employment. Our findings illustrate how useful it can be to view these as two separate processes. This is only possible using a longitudinal perspective.
There are limitations to this approach. We do not include information on the husband's receipt of Sozialhilfe in Germany. As noted above, it was not possible to include a potential wage for the wife. We treat the husband's status as strictly exogenous to the wife's.
Household decision-making might be more complex than presented! qualify for state means-tested benefits, they will not receive enough to protect them from relative income poverty. Thus means-tested benefits in Britain tend to discourage a second earner, and the unemployment benefit system itself may be contributing, in part, to the 'rise of the workless household' noted in the introduction. In Germany we find similar labourmarket participation of the wives of unemployed men, partly because women tend to enter employment when their husband has been unemployed. So, not only do German unemployed tend to receive the more generous insurance benefits, they also become, in the course of their unemployment, more likely to live in a household where their wife is working.
Most discussion of unemployment compensation and disincentives centres on the labour-market participation of the recipient. This paper serves as a timely reminder that unemployment compensation may affect the participation of their partners too, and this should be considered when evaluating unemployment compensation systems.
Notes
1. For the origins of this concept of an 'added-worker effect' and early empirical estimates of its magnitude in the USA, see Humphrey, 1940. 2 . Throughout the analysis in this paper where reference is made to 'wives' or 'husbands' this also includes cohabiting couples. 3. Following changes in the mid-1980s, older unemployed people with long contribution records are eligible for longer periods of Arbeitslosengeld than the standard 12 months (see McGinnity, 2001 : ch. 3 for details). 4. In Britain the period refers to the twelve months prior to the survey; in Germany it refers to the preceding calendar year.
5. For this size of sample the numbers of non-white households in the BHPS is small, and in both Britain and Germany female labour-force participation patterns are significantly different in the native population from within ethnic groups. 6. For Germany there are some months where individuals report multiple statuses. For this analysis we take any record of employment as a spell of employment. For example, if a woman reports part-time work and home duties in any month we take her status to be part-time employment. 7. An alternative strategy would be to model the exit to unemployment as part of a multinomial model with unemployment and non-participation as the two possible 'choices'. A technical problem with this approach is that there are a very small number of cases in the sample who make this transition. A conceptual problem is the notion of 'choosing to become unemployed' for those women who are in employment. We are interested in the impact of the husband's labour-force status on the labour supply of the wife, and our analysis assumes that the husband's status is exogenous to the wife's. If we assume that unemployment is not voluntary (and there are benefit penalties in both countries for voluntary unemployment: see McGinnity, 2001: ch. 3), it is difficult to conceive of a transition to unemployment as a reaction to, say, the husband's unemployment. 8. Even though the employment rate of the wives of unemployed men in Britain is somewhat higher than in Table 1 . Table 1 is based on data from 1991, at the beginning of the British period of observation. 9. In addition these statistics may be slightly affected by our spell 'cleaning' routine, where we take any reported employment in a month to be evidence of employment. Giannelli and Micklewright (1995) do not provide details of how they deal with multiple reported states. 10. This means that we cannot explicitly distinguish wives with a high earning potential from those with a low earning potential, aside from using covariates like education and labour-force experience. If the wives' earning potential is not adequately captured by these covariates, we may possibly overestimate the effect of the husband's unemployment on their labour-market transitions, as wives of unemployed men will tend to have lower earning potential than wives of employed men, and this may mean that they are less likely to enter the labour market, regardless of their husband's status. 11. For a thorough treatment of censoring see, for example, Allison (1984) . 12. As on both surveys education is recorded at yearly intervals, at the time of survey, we imputed the month of change as being June. 13. In both cases the results are not presented for reasons of space, but are available from the author on request.
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